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Toward More Sophisticated
Mediation Theory
John Lande*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the lead article in this symposium, Professor Jeffrey Stempel provides a very
thoughtful analysis of the mediation field.' He focuses on the debate over facilitative
and evaluative mediation' and he is critical of many of the arguments made by
proponents of facilitative mediation. I have expressed some similar concerns,' and
I generally agree with his analysis (with a quibble here and there). I do think that the
facilitation-evaluation debate has been productive (though admittedly wearisome),
and that proponents of facilitative mediation deserve more credit than he gives them
in his article. To balance the analysis, this commentary outlines some of the benefits
of the debate and the important contributions of facilitation proponents.
Before discussing the issues supplemental to Stempel's analysis, it is worth
summarizing Stempel's key points that I believe are well taken. First and foremost,
there is an important value in having a range of styles of mediation, including
evaluative mediation. Mediators frequently mix facilitative and evaluative
techniques in individual cases, which is often appropriate and beneficial.4
Appropriate use of predominantly one approach or the other may vary in part
depending on the type of case. 5 Some facilitation proponents take a rigidly orthodox
view that facilitative mediation is the only legitimate form of mediation, 6 predicated
on an ideology that uses a false and overly formalistic dichotomy.' At least some of
the discord over facilitative and evaluative techniques is based on whether the
mediators are lawyers or not, with lawyers tending toward a more evaluative

* Associate Professor and Director, LL.M, Program in Dispute Resolution, University of MissouriColumbia School of Law. Thanks to Lela Love, Bobbi McAdoo, Len Riskin, Jean Stemlight, and Nancy
Welsh for comments on an earlier draft, with the usual absolution of responsibility for my sins.
1. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitabilityof the Eclectic: LiberatingADRfrom Ideology, 2000 J. DISP.
RESOL. 247. Professor Stempel presented his paper at the University of Missouri-Columbia Center for
the Study of Dispute Resolution Annual Lecture on September 29, 2000.
2. For definition of these terms, see infra Part II.
3. John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation PracticesTransform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 839, 872-74 (1997).
4. Stempel, supra note 1, at 248-49, 263-69. For my similar views, including advocacy for pluralism
in mediation practice, see Lande, supranote 3, at 854-56, 869-71, 895-96. Some facilitation proponents
also endorse a mixture of facilitation and evaluation as long as the process is clearly labeled. See. e.g.,
Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes,Rather Than One Eclectic
Process,2000 J. DiSP. RESOL. 295, 296-97.
5. Stempel, supra note 1, at 285-90. For a discussion of the appropriateness of facilitative and
evaluative techniques in different types of cases, see infra Part IV.
6. Stempel, supra note 1, at 249-51.
7. Stempel, supra note I, at 269-71.
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approach and nonlawyers tending toward a more facilitative approach. This tension
is related to conflict over control of the field between lawyers and nonlawyers.'
I believe that the facilitation-evaluation debate has helped generate at least four
major benefits that Stempel's article does not adequately acknowledge. Some of
these benefits are due to the particular arguments of facilitation proponents, while
others involve a general development of the field resulting from the debate. The first
benefit is that facilitation proponents have highlighted how mediation can promote
many important values such as party self-determination, and they have cautioned
about risks of unfairness created by mediator evaluation as described in Part III.
Second, the facilitation-evaluation debate has stimulated a better appreciation of the
appropriateness of these techniques in different types of cases, as described in Part
IV. Third, the debate has contributed to reducing ill-considered evaluation practice,
as discussed in Part V. Fourth, the debate may cause many mediators to consider
and reject simple assumptions, developing a more sophisticated understanding of the
process. Re-examination of mediator evaluation could become part of a broader,
healthy questioning of taken-for-granted mediation theory more generally, as
considered in Part VI. Before examining these propositions, Part II provides a brief
review of terminology used in the debate and what I suggest are overly law-centered
assumptions embedded in Stempel's use of certain terms.

II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF TERMINOLOGY AND STEMPEL'S UNDERLYING
ASSUMPTIONS
Analyzing terminology used in the debate is important for conceptual clarity as
well as for revealing important assumptions embedded in the terms of debate. The
terms "facilitative" and "evaluative" mediation derive from the work of Leonard
Riskin. They represent opposite ends of one dimension of a grid intended to
illustrate some variations in mediation practice. 9 Mediators using a facilitative style
focus on eliciting the principals' opinions and refrain from pressing their own
opinions about preferable settlement options. Mediators using an evaluative style

8. Stempel, supranote 1, at 275-84. Stempel offers valuable insights into some general differences
in perspectives between mediators who are lawyers and those who are not. He suggests that lawyers tend
to be more evaluative and nonlawyers tend to be more facilitative, though he rightly notes that some
attorney-mediators embrace a philosophy of facilitation. Stempel, supra note 1, at 275, 282. Indeed,
many of those leading the effort to promote facilitation are lawyers. I think that Stempel makes too
broad a generalization that nonlawyers tend to prefer facilitative techniques. I suspect that one of the
main factors affecting mediators' approaches is whether they believe that they were retained for their
substantive expertise. Thus I suspect that engineers who mediate construction disputes, for example,
may tend to use evaluative techniques even though they are not lawyers.
9. The grid was first published in a brief version in 1994. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations,
Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 11I (1994).

Riskin

published an extended version two years later. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators'
Orientations,Strategies, and Techniques: A Gridfor the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996).
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develop their own opinions about preferable settlement options and may try to
influence principals to accept them.'0
Some people use the terms "facilitation" and "evaluation" interchangeably with
concepts of "settlement" and party "empowerment," most identified with the work
of Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger," even though the two pairs of terms
refer to distinct concepts. Settlement is the goal of terminating the dispute on any
mutually acceptable basis.' Empowerment is the goal of using mediation to
promote the parties' self-determination to resolve the dispute on whatever terms they
think best. Moreover, Bush and Folger describe empowerment as a goal of
"transformation" in which mediation is used to "engender[] moral growth toward
both strength and compassion," not just for the dispute being mediated, but for
3
changing people in the way that they deal with others and handle future disputes.'
I think of empowerment and settlement as goals for mediation whereas
facilitation and evaluation are techniques that mediators use. It makes sense that
mediators whose primary goal is empowerment would most often use facilitative
techniques and that mediators who are primarily oriented to settlement would be
techniques. There are exceptions. The technique of
more likely to use evaluative
"selective facilitation,"' 4 where mediators facilitate discussion toward some options
and away from others, tends to be oriented to settlement. On the other hand, some
mediators believe that it is important for parties to have the mediators' evaluations
in order to make informed 5decisions, but these mediators are careful to avoid
pressing the parties to settle.'
Stempel's article challenges the use of various terms that project too great a
status of mediation in his view. I have several quibbles with his points which seem
to focus on lawyers, law, and courts as the norm 6 more than I think is appropriate

10. Riskin, Grid, supra note 9, at 23-24. Love and Kovach distinguish reality testing and evaluation,
generally suggesting that "reality testing" is oriented to stimulate the parties' evaluation whereas
"evaluation" is where mediators provide their opinions to influence the negotiation outcome and/or
adversely affect the parties' self-determination. Love & Kovach, supra note 4, at 303-05. They note
that there is a gray area between the two. Love & Kovach, supra note 4, at 305. This gray area is huge
and dependent on many contextual factors. It is the source of much of the confusion and controversy
as some of the ostensible reality testing can be quite coercive whereas some of the evaluation can be
quite benign.
II. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO
CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).

12. See Lande, supra note 3, at 851-53.
13. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 11, at 28-32.
14. See David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation:Some PreliminaryObservations
on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators,23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 613 (1989).
15. See GARY J.FRIEDMAN, A GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION: HOW TO REACH A FAIR, LEGAL
SETTLEMENT AT A FRACTION OF THE COST 35 (1993).

16. This has been called a "legal centralist" perspective which, not surprisingly, is often taken for
granted by lawyers. See Marc Galanter, The PortableSoc 2; or, What to Do Until the Doctrine Comes,
in GENERAL EDUCATION INTHE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE COLLEGE OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 246, 250-53 (J.J. MacAloon ed., 1992); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many
Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering,and Indigenous Law, 19 J.OF LEGAL PLURALISM, 1, 1-3 (1981). An
alternative perspective is "legal pluralism," where courts of state law are not necessarily the only or
primary system of adjudication. See also infra note 21 and accompanying text. See generally Sally
Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 869 (1988); John Lande, The Diffusion of a
Process Pluralist Ideology of Disputing: Factors Affecting Opinions of Business Lawyers and Executives
7-8 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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or helpful. These quibbles are significant because they relate to what I think is
Stempel's unduly narrow view of mediation, as described in Part III. For example,
Stempel writes:
[M]any mediators have taken to referring to the disputing parties as the
mediator's "clients" or "principals" rather than merely the disputants who
have retained the mediator. Although this characterization is touching in
its connotative closeness, it misperceives the relationship. A disputant
does not use a mediator as an "agent" in the way in which clients or other
principals use lawyers or representatives as agents. In addition, of course,
the party has no particular claim to the mediator's zealous advocacy or
fiduciary duty (far from it). Rather, the mediator has a duty to serve the
parties and the17 situation in the aggregate rather than to represent either
party as such.
Accountants, realtors, hairdressers, and mediators, inter alia, can have clients
without owing them a duty of zealous advocacy. While the term "principal" can be
used in the context of legal agency rules, it also has a broader meaning in common
usage, referring to the main decision maker." Although mediators are not agents of
parties in mediation, when parties are represented in mediation, it is appropriate to
refer to parties as principals, in contrast to their attorneys, who in fact are their
agents.19
Another example of Stempel's narrow focus on the law as a standard of
reference is his preference to retain the qualifier "alternative" in the term "alternative
dispute resolution." He advocates this usage to signal that mediation, arbitration, and
other non-litigation techniques do not belong at the same status level as litigation,
which he argues is the "default means of dispute resolution in society."20 I do not
believe that litigation is, in fact, the default dispute resolution mechanism; empirical
evidence supports everyday experiences (of nonlawyers) that people turn to lawyers
and courts in only a small fraction of their problems.2 Moreover, making such

17. Stempel, supra note 1, at 263 n.65.
18. See Lande, supranote 3, at 842-43 n.l 1.
19. Lande, supra note 3, at 881-86.
20. Stempel, supra note 1,at 271 n.96.
21. See BARBARA A. CURRAN,THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL
SuRvEy 175 n.109 (1977) (finding similar statistics regarding lawyer usage); Richard E. Miller & Austin
Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV.525,
537, 542-43 (1980-81) (finding in study of claims of $1000 or more that lawyers were used in average
of only 23% of disputes and cases were filed in court in average of only 11.2% of disputes, which varied
by type of dispute). As Galanter points out, many discussions of ADR seem oblivious to the wide range
of non-court-related disputing mechanisms:
[C]uriously those dispute institutions that flourish and enjoy relative autonomy tend to be
omitted from discussions of ADR. Our social institutions are honeycombed by indigenous
forums that elaborate and enforce complex codes of conduct - in hospitals, schools,
condominiums, churches, the NCAA, and a multitude of other settings. Far more disputing
is conducted within these indigenous forums than in all the free-standing and courtannexed institutions staffed by arbitrators, mediators and other ADR professionals. This
profusion of indigenous law reminds us that the world of disputing includes much more
than traditional adjudication and the new ADR institutions.
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status comparisons seems counterproductive. I try to avoid them by using the term
"dispute resolution" to refer to all methods of dispute resolution including
litigation.22
A final example involves Stempel's objection to use of the term "professional"
as applied to mediators because mediation does not have the "historical pedigree"
of five traditional professions and does not satisfy "historical criteria of society,"
including required course of study, examination or other entrance requirements, and
self-regulation. 3 In common usage, "professional" has a much broader usage,
referring to people who use some skill to engage in an activity as a source of
livelihood or as a career.24 The term "professional" is commonly accepted to refer
to unpedigreed groups such as athletes, artists, business executives, and plumbers.
Thus it is appropriate to refer to mediators as professionals who serve clients without
using the legal system as the standard for measuring mediation's legitimacy. I
believe that these examples of Stempel's legal centralist perspective underlie the
inadequate appreciation of the values of a facilitative approach to mediation as well
as his excessive faith in an evaluative approach, as described in the next Part.

III. FACILITATION IS A GOOD PRACTICE THAT SHOULD BE PRESERVED,
MOREOVER MEDIATOR EVALUATION CREATES RISKS OF UNFAIRNESS
Using a facilitative approach is a good thing for mediators to do for many of the
reasons that facilitation proponents contend. Facilitation by mediators emphasizes
the principals' abilities to do their own critical evaluation and creative problemsolving.25 While this may not be the best approach for every person in every
problem that is mediated, mediation truly offers a distinctive opportunity for parties
to exercise responsibility over their own disputes and their own lives. This is an
important social value that other dispute resolution processes generally do not
promote.26 Many parties deeply appreciate the opportunity to work through
problems themselves based on their own standards of fairness. These parties prefer
to resolve their disputes themselves, without much substantive direction or pressure
by the neutrals or reliance on the law as the presumptive standard for decision

Marc Galanter, Compared to What? Assessing the Quality of Dispute Processing,66 DENV. U. L. REv.
xi, xiii (1989) (footnote omitted).
22. By the same token, I am not a fan of using the currently popular term "appropriatedispute
resolution" to imply that mediation, arbitration etc. are presumptively more appropriate than litigation,
as the term stirs up similarly unproductive status competitions. Some would use "appropriate dispute
resolution" to suggest the use of whatever means of dispute resolution is most appropriate in a given
case, including litigation in some cases.
23. Stempel, supra note 1, at 282-83.
24. WEBSTER'S NEW ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 806 (rev. ed. 1995).
25. Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
937, 944-45 (1997). For the record, I should disclose that I generally prefer to use more facilitative
approaches when I mediate. I have referred to this as promoting the principals' quality of consent.
Lande, supranote 3, at 857-79. This would be better termed the quality of decision making as the same
considerations generally apply regardless of whether the mediations result in agreement.
26. Love, supra note 25, at 943-44. See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection,
or Empowerment and Recognition? The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA.
L. REv. 253 (1991).
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making." Moreover, facilitation provides an opportunity to avoid or reduce
adversarial dynamics embodied in traditional litigation and often mirrored in
evaluative mediation.
Facilitation proponents are also right to express alarm about real and serious
risks entailed in evaluative techniques. Although mediator evaluation is sometimes
just what is needed to help parties seriously confront and resolve the issues in their
dispute, it also risks perpetuating adversarial dynamics and entrenchment of
positions.28 More important, mediator evaluation risks creating injustice through
heavy-handed pressure tactics and questionable evaluations by the mediators.29
Stempel argues that eclectic mediation that includes mediator evaluation can provide
an "antidote" to unfairness caused by passive facilitative mediators who permit
stronger parties to take advantage of weaker ones. ° I think that it is at least as likely
that evaluative mediators will side with the stronger party and thus arguably
aggravate the distributional problems that Stempel is legitimately concerned about.3
This analysis of fairness in mediation is premised on the notion that to promote
fairness mediators can and should equalize power, a highly arguable proposition in
my opinion.
If instead we use the law (defined as the likely results of litigation) as a standard
of fairness, good evaluative mediation certainly can help smooth the way toward fair
outcomes. However, this presumes that the legal rules provide fair results,32 the rules
are reasonably clear, judges and juries consistently follow the rules, and that
mediators can accurately assess the likely results. These are all debatable
assumptions. Often, cases go to mediation precisely because the likely results are
unclear.3 3 Thus, having mediators evaluate - and especially when they forcefully
press those evaluations on the disputants - creates a risk of manufacturing injustice
if the mediators' predictions are incorrect.

27. This is similar to Zumeta's argument. Zena Zumeta, A Facilitative MediatorResponds, 2000 J.
DisP. REsOL. 335, 336.
28. Love, supra note 25, at 940, 945-46.
29. Love, supra note 25, at 942-43.
30. Stempel, supra note I, at 254-56, 265-66.
31. See Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 J. DiSP. RESOL. 141. Although
Honeyman argues that mediation can provide weaker parties with significant gains, he notes that
mediator interventions in the "crunch" are likely to bear more heavily on weaker parties:
Some may object that [the perception that agreement to mediate is a sign of weakness] is
contrary to the well-known definition of a mediator as someone who listens to and reasons
politely with both parties only until he is sure which is weaker, and then jumps on that one
with both feet. There is no contradiction, however, because by the time any mediator
becomes that aggressive, the substantive concessions and the procedural or posture
improvements obtainable from the stronger party have already been made, or indicated to
be acceptable contingent on a comprehensive settlement. Pressing the weaker party at
what is aptly called "crunch" time is not evidence of bias, because it is necessary to
recognize differences in power. If mediators ignored the "real world" and attempted to base
all settlements on reason and brotherly love, stronger parties would obtain little benefit
from mediation and would soon avoid it. No mediator can long forget that though both
parties may be injured in an open collision, some are in a better position to survive a clash
than others.
Id. at 146.
32. As Stempel points out, this is not necessarily a valid assumption. Stempel, supra note 1, at 265.
33. Here I echo an argument made by my colleague, Chris Guthrie, at Professor Stempel's lecture.
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As Stempel noted, the amount of evaluative mediation practice seems to have
increased in recent years, particularly in court-connected mediation. 34 If this trend
continues, there is a serious risk that facilitative mediation could be completely
overtaken. Just as I argued that there should be a place in the field for evaluative3
mediation (rather than being defined out of existence by facilitation proponents),
I believe that there should be an important and continuing place in the field for
facilitative approaches as well. This pluralist view is based on the value of providing
disputants with distinct choices of dispute resolution processes. But for the
persistence of the facilitation proponents, it is conceivable that facilitative practice
would virtually die out, barely noticed, and society would lose the important value
of process diversity.
in listserv
Some of the arguments on both sides of the debate, particularly
37
36
postings and casual conversation, have seemed4 rigid, orthodox, extremist, 42
4°
narrow, purist, 39 dogmatic, emotional, strident, and even just plain irritating,
resulting in a general weariness with the topic. However, as tiresome as the debate
has been at times, I believe that it has been productive and that, overall, the
facilitation proponents make a valuable contribution and should be honored for it.

IV. THE FACILITATION-EVALUATION DEBATE HAS PROMPTED A MORE
REFINED UNDERSTANDING OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DIFFERENT
MEDIATION TECHNIQUES IN VARIOUS SITUATIONS
Stempel repeats the common notion that facilitation is more commonly used and
appropriate for family cases, and evaluation is more commonly used and appropriate
for commercial and tort cases, among others. 43 Although he uses qualifying
language at times and there is clearly some merit to his arguments, I think that
Stempel overstates the significance of the distinctions between different types of
cases." This notion may be a function of the limited procedural imagination of some
lawyers, mediators, and commentators.43 Some lawyers and evaluative mediators

34. Stempel, supra note 1, at 264-66.
35. Lande, supra note 3, at 856.
36. Stempel, supra note 1, at 254-56.
37. Stempel, supra note 1, at 258-60.
38. Stempel, supra note 1, at 254-55.
39. Stempel, supra note 1, at 252.
40. Stempel, supra note 1, at 270.
41. Stempel, supra note 1, at 269.
42. Cf. Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation:Moving Past Either/Or,2000 J. DISP. RESOL.
309, 319 (expressing frustration, feeling "tired" of the debate). I confess that I sometimes feel this way
too. This may be similar to the reaction that many mediators (myself included) have about passionately
assertive disputants and attorneys. I think that most mediators would agree that passionate partisans are
entitled to respect if they are acting in good faith and have valid concerns, even if we believe that their
positions and manners seem unreasonable.
43. Stempel, supra note 1, at 285-92.
44. Similar points are made by Love and Kovach, supra note 4, at 300-03.
45. Cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. RaV. 754, 789-94 (1984) (referring to "limited remedial imagination" of
courts); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediators and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-48 (1982) (referring to
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refer to some cases as "just money cases" in which the goal is to settle "for what the
case is worth." I suspect that in most such cases, there are many other significant
issues if they would look carefully. Money is often a symbol of other things, such
as finding a fair and honorable result, validation of injury, vindication of injustice,
"winning," demonstration of savvy, attribution of fault, perception of (not) being
"taken," scoring points against opposing counsel or other antagonists - and what the
disputants will say about the case to their superiors, colleagues, friends, and
relatives.
Let me note some examples highlighting the weakness of the idea that family
cases are especially appropriate for facilitation, and that tort cases are especially
appropriate for evaluation. Some mental health professionals mediating family cases
use evaluative techniques, and perhaps appropriately so, when dealing with issues
about the best interests of the children. On the other hand, a lawyer told me about
a workers' compensation case (where Stempel's formulation would suggest that
facilitative techniques would not be particularly suitable because of the lack of a
continuing relationship between the plaintiff and insurance carrier) in which
evaluative techniques were ineffective with a stubborn plaintiff who was unwilling
to accept "what the case was worth." Further questioning revealed the plaintiff's
interest in using the settlement money to buy a certain pickup truck, information
which led to a settlement. While these examples are obviously only anecdotal, I
think that they suggest that the family/tort distinction may be as unhelpful as the
facilitation/evaluation dichotomy that Stempel rightly criticizes.

V. THE FACILITATION-EVALUATION DEBATE HAS PROMPTED THE
MEDIATION FIELD TO BECOME MORE SELF-CONSCIOUS ABOUT
MEDIATION PRACTICES
Until recently, the facilitative perspective has been the stated orthodoxy of the
mediation field generally, not simply one faction. It has been socially unacceptable
in most mediation circles for mediators to admit expressing substantive opinions in
mediation. With the publication of Leonard Riskin's
"Grid"46 and the ensuing
48
47
earnest.
in
this
discussing
debate, mediators began
At a meeting of Florida mediators in 1997, I administered a questionnaire of
mediation techniques based on Riskin's Grid.49 The vast majority of mediators gave

lawyers' "standard philosophical map").
46. See supra text accompanying note 9.
47. See sources cited by Lande, supra note 3, at 842 n.9; Stempel, supra note 1, nn.l & 17.
48. Obviously Riskin's Grid reflected practices that had been going on for some time. When I was
in practice in the mid-1980s, I recall whispered conversations between mediators about how certain
mediators seemed quite directive. This was an accusation that would have caused a real stir if made
publicly. Similarly, Alfini reported on angst about evaluative techniques in the late 1980s and early
1990s. See generally James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and HashingIt Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation?," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991).
49. John Lande, Leaming Your Mediation Style, Workshop at the Florida Academy of Professional
Mediators Annual Meeting (Apr. 12, 1997). The survey is presented at Jeffrey Krivis & Barbara
McAdoo, A Style Index for Mediators, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 157 (1997).
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answers suggesting that they predominantly use facilitative techniques. Given the
widespread use of evaluative practice in much of the Florida mediation culture, the
image projected from the survey responses strained credulity. Assuming that the
results of these self-administered questionnaires were inconsistent with what
objective observers would report about the mediators' behavior, there are several
possible explanations. One is that evaluative mediators were aware of the evaluative
nature of their techniques but were too embarrassed to give honest answers publicly.
Another (not necessarily inconsistent) explanation is that the mediators were not
entirely aware of their own behavior. I recently observed a bright and experienced
mediator conducting a public policy mediation. This mediator subscribes to a pure
facilitation philosophy and was surprised and disturbed when afterwards, in privately
debriefing the mediation, I pointed out two relatively minor occasions when she had
expressed opinions about what she thought the parties should do.50 If not for the
facilitation-evaluation debate, neither one of us might have been that sensitive to
these concerns.
I suspect that the facilitation-evaluation debate has prompted mediators who use
evaluation to do so more self-consciously and perhaps reduce sloppy evaluation
practices." I lived in Florida for part of the time when the rules regarding mediator
evaluation were being debated and this deeply engaged members of the Florida
mediation community. 52 On a national level, practitioners have published numerous
articles suggesting methods for providing appropriate mediator evaluation. 3 It
seems likely that communications like these have prompted at least some mediators
to be more self-conscious in their use of evaluation.
I mention all this to suggest that this debate has served a valuable purpose and
led to some improvements in the field. "Closet" evaluators have been freed to

50. For what it is worth, the mediator's expression of opinions seemed relatively innocuous and her
statements did not appear to unduly influence the parties.
51. Dwight Golann presents an intriguing bit of evidence in analyzing four simulated mediations of
the same dispute by four experienced mediators with different actors playing the participants' roles in
the four simulations. Golann found a common pattern of mediators beginning by using facilitative
moves and generally shifting to more evaluative moves during the mediation. The mediators' use of
facilitative or evaluative tactics was largely a response to the ways that the parties played their roles,
which also seemed to be more of a factor in the outcomes than the mediators' tactics. Dwight Golann,
Variationsin Mediation:How-and Why-Legal MediatorsChange Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000
J. DisP. RESOL. 41, 60-61. This certainly does not prove that mediators have become more selfconscious in recent years about use of evaluative techniques or that the facilitation-evaluation debate
caused any increased sensitivity. These observations are, however, consistent with the theory that the
debate has had that effect.
52. For an insightful analysis of the recent revision of the Florida Rules for Certified and CourtAppointed Mediators, see Stempel, supra note 1, at 256-63.
53. See, e.g., Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Art of Evaluation, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 62 (1996); Tom Arnold, How Much Evaluation Should Be
Mixed into a Mediation Session? 16 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 54 (1998); John
Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 70 (1996);
Lawrence D. Connor, How to Combine Facilitationwith Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIG. 15 (1996) (stating that innovative procedure is appropriate only by consent of principals);
Carl T. Hahn, Using Evaluative Techniques: The Virginia Approach, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIG. 149 (1999);
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"come out of the closet ' 54 and now discuss mediation practices more openly."
Indeed, if not for the facilitation-evaluation debate, the knowledge in the mediation
field would be stuck at a more basic level.56 Moreover, it has prompted discussion
about techniques for providing evaluation with useful safeguards 7 as well as
improved theoretical understanding and policy analysis.5" While I realize that some
facilitation proponents would not view all these developments as positive nor wish
to take credit (or blame) for them, I view them as positive steps that resulted, in
significant part, from the persistence of facilitation proponents and the responses that
they stimulated.

VI. THE INCREASED SOPHISTICATION OF THE FIELD RESULTING FROM
THE FACILITATION-EVALUATION DEBATE MAY CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE
GENERAL WILLINGNESS TO EXAMINE MEDIATION THEORY
The experience of the facilitation-evaluation debate may be contributing to a
maturation of the mediation field to deal with a range of issues that are not
necessarily related to this particular debate. If so, this debate may have contributed
by causing reactions (like Stempel's) against assumptions based on rigid false
dichotomies propounded with intense partisail passion as well as by increasing
appreciation of the complexities of mediation practice and the contexts in which
mediation is used. I have some qualms about advancing this proposition of
maturation of the field because it is obviously speculative and perhaps it will be
proved quite wrong. Even if it turns out to be true in part, I would not expect a
complete or immediate transformation of the field, but rather a subtle and uneven
growth taking place in some areas more than others. If this maturation is occurring,
I would expect increased willingness to question many different strongly-held
assumptions based more on faith and self-interest than careful observation and
analysis.

54. Obviously there are significant differences between disclosing one's mediation style and
disclosing one's sexual orientation, so this analogy is imperfect, though hopefully appropriately
evocative. I suspect that there is a similarity in that there has been a public debate which prompted
proponents of both sides to publicly articulate their positions and that having people publicly "come out"
has emboldened others to come out as well.
55. See supra note 54.
56. When Riskin published his Grid in the mid-1990s, I believe that the majority view among
mediators was that mediators should not give evaluations in mediation. I agree with Stempel that this
is probably no longer the case, as some version of his eclectic vision is probably the dominant view
today. Stempel, supra note 1,at 250 n.10. See Birke, supra note 42; Golann, supra note 51; Zumeta,
supra note 27; sources cited at id. nn.6 & 67 (supporting Stempel's eclectic vision);
57. For an excellent set of prescriptions for careful mediator evaluation, see DWIGHT GOLANN,
MEDIATING LEGAL DIsPUTES 267-305 (1996) (Marjorie Corman Aaron, contributing author) (offering
good advice about whether, when, and how mediators should offer evaluations).
58. For an excellent analysis of self-determination, the key value underlying facilitation theory, and
a provocative policy proposal, see Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in CourtConnected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001) (using courts' assessments of allegations of mediator coercion to define selfdetermination and proposing a three-day non-waivable cooling-off period before mediated settlement
agreements become binding).
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assumptions based more on faith and self-interest than careful observation and
analysis.
Mediation statutes, codes of conduct, texts, promotional literature, and even law
review articles are full of assumptions about the essential nature of mediation. Many
of these assumptions are highly debatable. Let me mention two.
Recent debates over the drafting of a Uniform Mediation Act 9 raise questions
about the necessity of confidentiality for mediation. Confidentiality is widely
assumed to be essential for mediation to work properly. 0 Without commenting on
the merits of the Uniform Mediation Act, which is well beyond the scope of this
commentary, I have increasing doubts about the necessity -and empirical reality
-of confidentiality in mediation. 6 In child protection mediations that I conducted
under the protection of a state mediation confidentiality statute, attorneys and parties
regularly seemed cautious about what they would say in mediation. Sometimes in
the mediations, attorneys would instruct their clients not to say anything; more often,
attorneys and participants would simply "clam up" when sensitive topics were
raised. This experience is consistent with many reports I have heard from attorneys
who are very wary about what their clients might say in mediation. Some of this
hesitance may be due to concern about possibly weakening one's bargaining position
within the mediation, but that did not seem to be the usual motivation as the hesitant
participants seemed to be more concerned about possible consequences if the
information would be presented in court. Moreover, it does not suggest that
participants have a lot of confidence that "everything will stay in the room," as some
mediators promise.
Here are some examples to illustrate problems with assumptions about the
necessity of confidentiality. I recently talked with two Missouri attorneys who are
frequent users of mediation and who are convinced that not only do the courtappointed mediators discuss the cases with the judges assigned to the cases, but that
mediators write notes about the cases that are included in the court files. Despite the
lack of confidence in the confidentiality of mediation, these two attorneys - and
many others - are generally quite satisfied users of mediation. For them,
confidentiality is clearly not as important as having what they consider to be
knowledgeable, reasonable, and fair-minded mediators. Another illustration is a
child protection mediation program in Michigan which generally operates well
despite a local rule explicitly negating confidentiality in mediation.62 The point of

59. Uniform Mediation Act (visited Sept. 29, 2000) <http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma>.
60. See, e.g., Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Ethical Standards of Professional
Responsibility (1986), reprinted in MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF
MEDIATION 169-72 (1996) ("Maintaining confidentiality is critical to the dispute resolution process.
Confidentiality encourages candor, a full exploration of the issues, and a neutral's acceptability.").
61. Even though confidentiality may not be as needed or effective as many people assume, it may
nonetheless be appropriate to statutorily preclude use of mediation as a means of manufacturing evidence
for later proceedings.
62. Telephone Interview with Susan Butterwick, Coordinator of the Dispute Resolution Center
Permanency Planning Mediation Project of the Washtenaw County (Michigan) Family Court (Oct. 17,
2000). Under the state Child Protection Law, only the attomey-client privilege is recognized in child
protective proceedings. See In re Brock, 499 N.W.2d 752, 759-61 (Mich. 1993). As a result, the
attorneys and mediators working in these cases operate as if statements in mediation are not confidential
and may be introduced as evidence in later proceedings. The Mediation Project is therefore careful to
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all of this is that most mediators have been operating on a stated assumption that
participants generally rely on confidentiality and that such reliance is necessary for
mediation to work properly. Having had the courage to come out of the closet on
evaluation, perhaps the mediation community may be more willing to take a careful
look at confidentiality.
A second example has to do with a cherished assumption that mediators must
be neutral. This is a premise underlying much professional mediation in the United
States. As Moore has shown, this is a narrow, culture-bound conception of
mediation activity that does not reflect the fact that much mediation is done by
powerful members of organizations, tribes, and communities who have strong
interests and opinions about the outcomes of the problems they mediate.63 A study
of in-house mediation of employment cases from the United States Postal Service
("USPS") found that disputants were fairly satisfied with mediators from within the
Postal Service even though they were not perceived to be as neutral as outside
mediators.' Similarly, many ombuds practitioners regularly operate effectively
despite lack of complete "independence" from their organizations.65 This heretical
notion was nicely captured in the title of a workshop at a recent conference, "Agency
Neutrals: An Oxymoron Whose Time Has Come?"'
Will mediators, in fact, take that hard look at the realities of confidentiality,
neutrality, and the rest of accepted mediation theory? 67 And if they do, will that have
been influenced by the increased sophistication from the debate over evaluation? If
so, this facilitation-evaluation debate would admittedly be a limited and indirect
influence. Yet it is not completely implausible that this episode has had some
general maturing effect on the field.

VII. CONCLUSION
In his article in this Symposium, Jeffrey Stempel makes a valuable contribution
to our understanding of the mediation field. While I believe that his article fairly
analyzes some deficiencies in the perspectives of facilitation proponents, in my view,
it does not adequately credit their important contributions to the field. Though
disputes over facilitation and evaluation in mediation have been strident and

select cases where the lack of confidentiality protection is not expected to cause problems.
63.

CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING

CONFLICT 41-53 (2d ed. 1996).

64. Lisa Bingham et al., Mediating Employment Disputes at the United States Postal Service: A
Comparisonof In-House and Outside Neutral Mediator Models, 20 REv. OF PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN.
(forthcoming) (finding that although disputants were more satisfied with outside mediators, disputants
who used in-house mediation reported being fairly satisfied).
65. See generally Howard Gadlin, The Ombudsman: What's in a Name?, 16 NEGOT. J. 37 (2000).
66. Session 3.11 at the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution Annual Conference (Sept. 24,
1999).
67. Birke's commentary in this symposium lists many issues that are worthy of the more sophisticated
analysis Iam suggesting. See Birke, supra note 42, at 319. Assumptions about the nature of power and
the effects of mediators' interventions on power imbalances are particularly ripe for re-examination in
my view. For a discussion of some problems with conceptions of power imbalance, see supra text
accompanying notes 29-33.
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unpleasant at times, the debates have moved the field forward to more refined
understandings and practices.
I share Stempel's preference for eclectic approaches by mediators. I think that
the reference to "ideology" in the title of Stempel's article gets closer to the heart of
the matter. But rather than "liberating" the field from ideology, I advocate
refinement and respectful embrace of an eclectic variety of mediation ideologies and
practices.68 Thus, I hope that as the mediation field develops, shoppers for mediation
services will have many clear choices of distinct types of mediation so that they can
choose from mediators with reputations for emphasizing many different goals and
approaches including empowerment, settlement, facilitation, and evaluation, as well
as eclectic.69
There is the potential for using the lessons learned from this episode to foster a
more general sophistication in our thinking. The extent to which that occurs, if any,
will largely depend on the determination of members of the diverse dispute
resolution community to engage in the ideals we generally aspire to, including
honest self-analysis, respect for differing perspectives, and creative interest-based
problem solving.

68. See Lande, supra note 3, at 895-97.
69. Thus I wholeheartedly agree with Love and Kovach's advocacy of"an eclectic array of processes,
rather than one eclectic process." Love & Kovach, supra note 4. 1believe that it is possible to include
a variety of elements in this array that are labeled as different types of mediation. Lande, supra note 3,
at 856 n.73.
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